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Abstract
This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties
building on the premise that leaders need to maintain support within the organization
to continue leading. Payments distributed by the incumbent on the spot increase the
value of promises of future benefits by fostering individuals’ perceived chances that the
incumbent will retain her position. The main result of the paper shows, in fact, that the
party leader can use promises of future benefits to induce members to vote for a position
disliked by the majority of the party only if she also distributes benefits on the spot.
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Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline
and Vote Buying in Legislatures∗
Matias Iaryczower†
“. . . as soon as Chamberlain had lost the confidence of a sizeable proportion of
his followers in the Commons his powers as Leader of the Party (which seem
on paper so impressive) were of no great importance. The vast powers of the
Leader of the Conservative Party are exercised only with the consent of his
followers . . .However powerful he may be while he enjoys the confidence of
his followers his authority evaporates the moment he loses that confidence.”
(McKenzie (1964))
1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the study of representative democracy is how partisan
organizations shape decision-making in legislatures. When party discipline is strong,
legislators of the same party behave cohesively, even in spite of significant internal dis-
sent.1 Disciplined parties can therefore significantly alter the aggregation rule by which
legislators’ and citizens’ preferences are transformed into policy outcomes. Under what
conditions will a party leader be able to induce legislators of her party to support the
party line, even against their preferences? When will party leaders have to yield, in-
stead, to the views of a majority of the party? In this paper, I build on a simple but
general observation about organizations - and parties in particular - to answer these
questions. While leaders are endowed with resources with which to influence legisla-
tors’ voting behavior, their control of the leadership is always a conditional one: leaders
need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading (McKenzie (1964),
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Juliana Bambaci for helpful discussions and suggestions. I am also thankful to numerous seminar partici-
pants at Caltech, Chicago, Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Maryland, U. Penn, Princeton, Rice, Stanford,
UC Berkeley, UCSD, and Washington University in St. Louis, as well as to many others at UCLA, for
useful comments to previous versions of this paper.
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91125, USA, email: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu
1See Krehbiel (1993), Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Tsebelis (1995).
Jones (1968), Sinclair (1983), Calvert (1987), Panebianco (1988), Cox and McCubbins
(2005b), Myerson (2005)).2
This paper formalizes the tradeoff between resources at the leader’s discretion and
the contestable nature of the leadership position in the context of a heterogeneous group
of party backbenchers (PBs) who are uncertain about the distribution of fellow party
members preferences in a policy space. I model the internal constraints faced by the
incumbent party leader as the partisan equivalent of a confidence vote procedure: the
party leader is overthrown whenever her advocated position does not gather the support
of a minimum proportion of party backbenchers in the legislature. I distinguish between
payments that can be distributed on the spot to both members of the party and the
opposition (pork) and promises of future partisan benefits, such as nomination to party
lists. Introducing this distinction allows me to reevaluate the conventional wisdom in
political science that “leaders who possess this power [nomination control] should be
able to discipline their followers” (Morgenstern (2004)).3 It also allows me to study the
interactions between spot payments and (promises of) future payments: will weak or
strong parties use legislative “grease” build cross party coalitions?
The key effect of a leadership replacement in the model is its effect on the allocation
of promises of future benefits, which as opposed to spot payments can only be delivered
if the incumbent leader retains the command of the party. The central theme that unifies
the results of the paper follows directly from this fact. Since promises are conditional on
the stability of the leader, their value is not exogenously given, but instead endogenously
determined by backbenchers’ beliefs about the extent of support to the incumbent among
other party legislators. How these beliefs are formed determines how the collective ac-
tion problem among PBs opposing the incumbent is resolved, and thus ultimately how
powerful the leader is vis a vis the collective principal. Discipline will also be affected
by the nature and amount of resources available to the leaders, but the impact of these
various instruments will be filtered by how each of them contributes to backbenchers’
expectations about the incumbent’s survival.
The first result shows that promises of future benefits are not well suited for this task,
and can therefore be completely ineffective to provide discipline in legislative parties. It
is enough for this that two conditions hold: the incumbent leader (a) has no resources
to distribute on the spot and (b) can be overthrown by a rebellion of a majority of the
party. Proposition 2 shows that under these conditions influence follows, in effect, from
the bottom up: promises are useful (and used) only if ex ante a majority of the party
agrees with the incumbent leader on the ranking of alternatives in the first place. This
result complements the conventional wisdom prevailing in the discipline regarding the
impact of nomination power on party discipline. The general moral is that promises of
2Party leaders do in fact fall. The resignation of Gerhard Schroeder as chairman of the Social
Democratic Party (Germany) in February 2004 provides one of the latest well known examples.
3Similar assertions are widespread across the literature. Schattschneider (1942) (cited in Morgenstern
(2004)) puts it even more bluntly: “The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of
the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.”
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future benefits will be relevant to alter voting behavior only if party members believe
that the incumbent leader has a strong hold to the reins of power. With no resources to
distribute on the spot, the leadership of a majoritarian institution is only conditionally
stable, and the leader merely an agent of the majority of the party.
That the leader does have any influence under these conditions is entirely due to the
heterogeneity of preferences within the party. While the leader is powerless without the
support of the majority of the party, when she does have the ex ante support of a majority
of the party the leader can exploit the possibility of internal conflict to bolster the support
for the party line. As the homogeneity of backbenchers’ preferences (and therefore the
possibility of conflict) decreases, however, the leader’s influence decreases as well, and
party discipline vanishes as the heterogeneity of party members’ ideal policies goes to zero:
in the limit as PBs are almost perfectly homogeneous, a leader that needs the support
of a majority of the party is powerless against the collective principal (proposition 3).
The negative relationship between discipline and the homogeneity of the group’s pref-
erences still holds when the leader is endowed with resources to distribute on the spot
(proposition 5). Introducing spot payments, however, breaks the exact correspondence
between majority support and influence of promises of future benefits. If endowed with
sufficiently large amount of spot payments, the incumbent can make promises of future
benefits valuable even when ex ante a majority of the party opposes the party line. To
do so, however, the incumbent needs in fact to buy the party. As a result, the influence
of backbenchers is lost, but rather reshaped in terms of a lower bound of payments that
needs to be allocated to party members for party resources to be in play.
The previous result highlights the fact that (opposite to disputable resources such
as promises of future benefits) spot payments are highly effective in this environment.
In addition to their direct effect on PBs’ behavior, spot payments increase the value
of promises of future partisan benefits through their impact on the beliefs about the
leader’s survival. Keeping PBs’ beliefs about the actions of fellow party members fixed,
an increase of one dollar in the allocation of pork to party members increases the net
value of the incumbent’s offer by the same amount. Beliefs about the actions of other
PBs will not remain fixed, however, as the revised offer will induce PBs to anticipate a
higher support to the party line among party members, and thus a higher probability of
the incumbent’s survival, leading ultimately to a higher expected value of her promises.
The magnitude of the complementarity between spot payments and the value of
promises of future benefits is a key determinant of the net benefit of allocating these
payments to the party or the opposition. While pork can be used to attain the support
of opposition legislators, this allocation has an opportunity cost: buying the opposi-
tion implies weakening the support inside the party. The magnitude of this opportunity
cost will be determined, in fact, by the strength of the complementarity between spot
payments and the value of promises of future benefits. Proposition 4 exploits the fact
that the multiplier effect of current resources is higher the more exposed the incumbent
is to internal threats, to conclude that more vulnerable leaders will allocate a higher
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proportion of pork to buy members of their own party vis-a-vis the opposition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented
in section 2. Section 3 characterizes a symmetric, pure equilibrium employing cutoff
strategies, and provides sufficient conditions for this equilibrium to be unique.4 Section 4
develops the substantive results. Section 5 extends the model to include an endogenous
determination of the challenge to the incumbent leader. I show here that the basic model
is a stylized description of this extended framework, assuming that policy alternatives
are not “too close” in the policy space. Section 6 relates the framework and results with
the literature, and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
There are three types of agents in the model: (i) a party leader, (ii) a continuum of party
backbenchers (PBs), with total size 1 and (iii) a continuum of size β < 1 of opposition
legislators. PBs and opposition legislators compose a legislature, which chooses between
two given policy alternatives q and x in R, q < x, by simple majority voting.5
Legislators’ Preferences & Information.
PBs face a tradeoff between pleasing their constituencies and the party leadership,
two “masters” with (generically) different objectives. Their payoffs are thus determined
by (i) “monetary” benefits they can extract from the party leadership, and (ii) the
distance between their constituents “ideal policy” θi and the policy they voted for in the
legislature, xi ∈ {q, x}. In particular, monetary transfers enter linearly into their utility
function, and policy preferences of PB i are represented by a utility function u(|xi − θi|).
It will be convenient to define - taking the pair (q, x) of policy alternatives as given - the
function v(θi) ≡ u(|q − θi|)− u(|x− θi|). The value v(θi) denotes the net gain of voting
for q instead of x for PB i, with ideal policy θi. Note that by construction v(θi) = 0
at θi =
x+q
2
, and that |v(·)| is symmetric around this point. Moreover, I will assume
throughout that v(·) is a continuous function satisfying the following condition:
Assumption (A1). There exists α > 0 such that for all (θi, θ
′
i) with θ
′
i > θi,
v(θi)− v(θ′i) ≥ α (θ′i − θi)
4Since opposing the incumbent leader can only be profitable if the size of the rebellion is big enough
to alter the incumbent’s proposed allocation of partisan benefits, PBs’ choices are strategic complements.
In this setting, assuming common knowledge of preferences yields multiple equilibria, sustained by self
fulfilling beliefs. Relaxing this assumption, however, allows us to pin down a unique equilibrium. The
argument for uniqueness follows Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2003) and Frankel et al. (2001).
5With fixed alternatives, we can as well take our policy space to be Rn. Similarly, as it will be
apparent soon, nothing here depends on the voting rule being simple majority.
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The ideal policy of each PB, θi, is private information, but correlated with that of the
other PBs.6 Specifically, I assume that the ideal policy of PB i is given by θi = θ + εi,
where the common component θ is drawn from a N(θ0, η
2) distribution, the idiosyncratic
component εi is i.i.d., and drawn from a N(0, σ
2) distribution, and both θ and εi are
unobservable. Intuitively, a Democrat from California can observe the preferences of his
constituency, but is not able to disentangle which part is due to them being californian
and which part is due to them being democrats. Note then that PBs are uncertain about
the distribution of their fellow party members in the policy space, and that they will be
able to use their private information to reduce this uncertainty. Opposition legislators
have policy preferences u(·) identical to those of PBs. Although their ideal policies are
private information, I assume that they are distributed according to a known c.d.f. G (·).
This implies, in particular, that the proportion of opposition legislators with ideal policy
below some number z is public information.7
Party Leadership & Payments
The party leader cares about the policy outcome: the leader obtains net benefit w > 0
from the policy outcome being x instead of q. The leader is endowed with two types of
resources with which to influence legislators’ voting behavior: (i) spot payments (or
pork) that can be distributed to both PBs (r) and opposition legislators (ro), and (ii)
promises of future partisan benefits (e) that can only be distributed to PBs. As the
notation suggests, I will restrict to payments that are symmetric among legislators of the
same party. Moreover, I will only allow payments to an individual to be conditional on
his actions, thus precluding more complex mechanisms that could possibly depend on
aggregate voting patterns. The result is the simplest possible model that allows us to
focus on (i) the leader’s decision of whether to attempt to actively influence the party
and (ii) backbenchers’ collective action problem of whether to follow or rebel against the
leader, in an environment that is sufficiently rich so as to incorporate the key elements
pinning down the resolution of party discipline.8
Spot payments are conditional offers: a PB receives r when voting in favor of x, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, an opposition legislator receives ro when voting in favor of x,
and zero otherwise. The party leader chooses r and ro subject to the (ex ante) budget
constraint roβ + r ≤ R, where R denotes the total amount of pork resources available to
the leader. Residuals from unaccepted offers are kept by the incumbent leader. Unlike
pork - the allocation of which is final and irreversible - conditional promises of partisan
benefits can only be delivered if the incumbent leader survives internal challenges to her
authority. Specifically, I assume that the party leader can choose between two alternative
procedures, which I call a partisan and a non-partisan vote.
6With minor modifications, we could assume that the preferences of a fraction of “partisan” PBs are
public information, and carry out the analysis with respect to the fraction of “moderate” PBs.
7The relevant assumption here is that there are no leadership challenges in the opposition.
8For an otherwise richer (asides the endogeneity of promises of future benefits) model of vote buying,
see Dekel et al. (2004). For other important contributions, see Snyder (1991), Groseclose and Snyder
(1996), Diermeier and Myerson (1999), Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001).
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In a non-partisan vote the incumbent commits to distribute e to every PB irrespective
of his vote. Promises of future partisan benefits thus play no role in influencing the
voting behavior of PBs. Moreover, in the basic model, I assume that this unconditional
allocation of partisan benefits is never challenged. The net payoff of voting for x for PB
i in a non-partisan vote is then given by Πnp(θi) = r − v(θi). In a party vote, instead,
the incumbent commits to distribute e only to PBs voting for x, and zero to others. I
will assume, however, that the conditional allocation of partisan benefits implicit in the
party vote will always trigger a challenge to the party leader.9 A challenge consists of an
alternative conditional distribution of partisan benefits: if a challenge is successful, PBs
voting for q receive electoral benefits e, and those voting for x receive zero.10 A challenge
is successful if the incumbent’s advocated position does not gather sufficient support by
PBs in the legislature; i.e., if the mass of PBs in the incumbent’s coalition, denoted by
Γ, does not reach a minimum threshold µ (µ ≤ 1/2). To summarize, the net monetary
payoff for a PB voting for x is e if the incumbent survives the challenge (if Γ < µ), and
−e if the incumbent is overthrown. The net expected payoff of voting for x for PB i in
a party vote is then Πp(θi) = r + e [1− 2Pr (Γ < µ|θi)]− v(θi)
Strategies and Equilibrium
Taking advantage of my minimalist representation of opposition legislators, I will
exclude them from the set of players, and instead consider their best responses as part
of the environment. Specifically, since the pork resource constraint roβ+ r ≤ R will hold
with equality at the optimum, we substitute ro =
R−r
β
, and treat the main party leader’s
allocation decision simply as a choice of a pork offer to party members r ∈ [0, R]. Given
any such offer r, the mass of legislators in the opposition voting for x is then given by[
1−G
(
v−1
(
R−r
β
))]
β. The players in the modified game are therefore PBs and the
incumbent party leader.
The timeline consists of three stages. In Stage 1, nature chooses a realization of the
unobservable random variables θ and {εi}, and each PB i privately observes his ideal
policy θi = θ+ εi. The party leader receives no such private signal. In Stage 2, the party
leader decides (i) whether to make the vote a non-partisan vote or a party vote, and (ii)
an allocation of pork to PBs. In Stage 3, legislators vote between the alternatives x and
q.
A strategy for the incumbent leader is therefore a choice of a couple (aI , r), where
aI ∈ {np, p} and r ∈ [0, R]. The incumbent’s choice of aI induces, respectively, a non-
partisan-voting game and a party-voting game among PBs. A strategy for a PB i can
9Section 5 extends the model allowing an endogenous determination of the challenge. There we show
that the incumbent won’t be challenged (i) in a non-partisan vote or (ii) in a party vote if x is sufficiently
close to q (x < x˜ for some x˜), but is challenged whenever x > x˜. The basic model is thus a reduced form
of the complete model, assuming that alternatives are not “too close” in the policy space.
10As with pork, due to unaccepted offers, in a party vote there won’t be ex post budget balance of
electoral benefits. The remainder can be assumed to be distributed to party members who are not
currently in Congress, or kept in the leader’s safe box.
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therefore be described by a pair of functions κnpi (·; r) and κpi (·; r) mapping the set of
types Θ and possible pork allocations to party members [0, R] to {q, x}. The resulting
κnpi (θi; r) and κ
p
i (θi; r) are therefore the votes of a PB i with ideal policy θi in the
non-partisan-voting and party-voting games, given an offer of pork r to party members.
An equilibrium is a strategy profile ((aI , r), {κnpi (·; r) ,κpi (·; r)}i) such that (i) (aI , r) is
feasible and sequentially rational and that (ii) {κnpi (·; r)}i and {κpi (·; r)}i constitute,
respectively, a BNE of the non-partisan-voting and party-voting games.
3 The Fundamentals: Voting
After characterizing equilibria in non-partisan voting (Remark 1), I turn to the core of the
section: the analysis of party votes. I show that if the distribution of PBs’ preferences is
common knowledge, radically different behavioral patterns can be sustained as equilibria
of party votes by self-fulfilling beliefs (Remark 2). Relaxing this assumption allows us to
pin down a unique equilibrium, which I characterize in Proposition 1.
Consider first non-partisan voting. Note that the net payoff of voting for x for a PB i
is here given by Πnp(θi) = r − v(θi), and is therefore independent of the actions of other
players (this is a decision problem). Letting δnp(r) ≡ v−1(r), we then have
Remark 1 (Non-Partisan Voting) In a non-partisan voting equilibrium, κnpi (θi; r) =
x for all i such that θi > δnp(r) and κnpi (θi; r) = q for all i such that θi < δnp(r)
The situation is qualitatively different in a party vote. In a party vote, only PBs with
”extreme” policy preferences are impervious to the actions of fellow party members. The
decision of ”centrist” individuals, instead, is determined by their beliefs about what others
will do. For these individuals, supporting the incumbent’s party line is optimal only if
doing so allows them to capture a sufficiently high level of expected party payments. The
net expected value of the incumbent’s offer for individual i depends, in turn, on whether
the incumbent leader will be able to retain the command of the party, and thus on i ’s
beliefs about the proportion of PBs supporting the incumbent’s party line. If i believes
that more than µ PBs will stick with the incumbent leader, he will want to do so as well;
if he believes that at least 1− µ PBs will defect, he will ”defect” too.
In particular, if the distribution of party members’ preferences is common knowledge,
and the proportion of ”extremists” is not high enough to determine the outcome of
the incumbent’s survival from the outset, radically different behavioral patterns can be
sustained as equilibria by self-fulfilling beliefs.11
11When θ + σΦ−1(1 − µ) < θi, strategy profile (1) in the remark constitutes the unique BNE of the
party vote game. Similarly, when θ + σΦ−1(1− µ) > θi, strategy profile (2) is the unique BNE.
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Remark 2 Let θi ≡ v−1(r+e) and θi ≡ v−1(r−e). Suppose that θ is common knowledge,
and that θi < θ + σΦ
−1(1− µ) < θi. Then the following strategy profiles are BNE of the
party voting game:
(1) κpi (θi; r) = x ∀i : θi > θi and κpi (θi; r) = q ∀i : θi < θi and
(2) κpi (θi; r) = x ∀i : θi > θi and κpi (θi; r) = q ∀i : θi < θi
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
The assumption that the distribution of party members’ preferences is common knowl-
edge among PBs, however, is not desirable per se. Moreover, as recent developments in
the global games literature show, relaxing this assumption allows us to pin down a unique
equilibrium (see Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2003) and Frankel et al. (2001). The basic
results are summarized in proposition 1 below: when PBs are uncertain about the cen-
tral tendency of the party (i) there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which PBs employ
switching strategies with a cutpoint δp ∈
(
θi, θi
)
. Moreover, (ii) this equilibrium is unique
provided that the uncertainty about the central tendency of the party (as parameterized
by η) is high enough. The cutpoint δp, which completely characterizes this equilibrium,
is pinned down by the net expected value attached by the critical player with ideal policy
δp to the promises of electoral benefits made by the incumbent leader.
3.1 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Party Votes
Consider a symmetric strategy profile in which PBs employ switching strategies with an
arbitrary cutpoint δ. Denote by Π(θi; δ) the net expected benefit of supporting x for a PB
with ideal policy θi given this strategy profile. Similarly, denote by Γ(θ, δ) the proportion
of PBs voting for x according to this strategy profile given a particular realization of θ.
Since θi|θ ∼ N(θ, σ2), then Γ(θ, δ) = 1−Φ( δ−θσ ), where Φ (·) is the c.d.f. of the standard
normal. Hence Γ(θ, δ) = 1− Φ( δ−θ
σ
) < µ⇐⇒ θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ), so that
Π(θi; δ) = r + e [1− 2Pr (θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ)|θi)]− v (θi)
By Bayes’ Law, θ|θi ∼ N(θ̂ (θi) , η̂2), where θ̂ (θi) ≡ σ2θ0+η2θiσ2+η2 and η̂ ≡ ση√σ2+η2 . I then
define the function
P (δ, θi) ≡ 1− 2Φ
(θ − θ̂ (θi)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)
 (1)
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Intuitively, P (δ, θi) is the net expected value of a dollar of electoral benefits made
conditional on supporting the incumbent leader’s party line for an individual with ideal
policy θi, when every PB uses a switching strategy with cutoff point δ. Then:
Π(θi; δ) = r + eP (δ, θi)− v (θi)
Denoting by p(δ) ≡ P (δ, δ) the net expected value of a dollar of electoral benefits for the
critical PB with ideal policy δ, and letting pi(δ) ≡ Π(δ; δ), we have
pi(δ) = r + ep(δ)− v (δ)
Lemma 3 in the appendix shows that (i) p(·) is a decreasing function, and that (ii) |p′(·)|
is bounded above by a decreasing function of η which goes to zero as η →∞. To grasp
the intuition for the first result, note that this is equivalent to saying that a more ”right-
winged” critical PB assigns a higher probability to the incumbent being overthrown.
Since the cdf of θ conditional on θi is stochastically increasing in θi, an increase in δ
not only (i) increases the cutoff point determining whether other PBs will support or
challenge the incumbent (vote for x or q), but also (ii) changes the beliefs of the critical
PB concerning the central tendency of the party: a more right-winged critical PB will
consider less likely that the incumbent will be overthrown. As the effect of δ on beliefs
is dampened by the priors, however, the first effect dominates, producing the result.12
Since by A1 the slope of v(·) is bounded away from zero, this implies that for sufficiently
high η, pi(·) is an increasing function and pi(δ) = 0 at exactly one point.
[Figure 1]
Proposition 1 is then a rather straightforward application of similar results in the global
games literature (see Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2003), and Frankel et al. (2001)):
Proposition 1 Let δp ∈ {δ : pi(δ) = 0} 6= ∅. There exists a symmetric equilibrium of the
party vote game in which κpi (θi, r) = x for all i such that θi ≥ δp and κpi (θi, r) = q for all i
such that θi < δp. Moreover, there exists a η such that whenever η > η, {δ : pi(δ) = 0} has
a single element δp, and this equilibrium is unique.
12The second result follows from the same logic, since increasing η diffuses the prior, and thus dimin-
ishes the ”dampening” of the change in beliefs.
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4 Party Discipline and Vote Buying
In this section, I turn to the substantive analysis leading to the main conclusions of the
paper. In doing so, I assume throughout that the condition in proposition 1 is met. I start
by making precise the definition of party discipline that I will employ in the remainder
of the paper.
4.1 Party Discipline: A Definition
The informal definition of party discipline advanced in the introduction referred to the
ability of party leaders to influence the voting behavior of PBs with partisan resources.
This brief section has the double purpose of providing a rationale for this definition, and
of making it more precise. The definition I will employ is as follows:
Definition 1 Define party discipline, d : [0, R]→ R, by
d(r) ≡ inf{θi : κnpi (θi; r) = x} − inf{θi : κpi (θi; r) = x} = δnp − δp
That is, given an allocation r of pork to party members, I define party discipline as the
difference between the ideal policy of the most left-winged PB supporting the incumbent’s
party line in a non-partisan vote, and that of the most left-winged PB supporting the
party line in a party vote. By remark 1 and proposition 1, then, it follows that (i)
d(r) = δnp − δp, and (ii) d(r) > 0 ⇔ p(δp) > 0. Point (ii) simply notes that discipline
is positive if and only if the critical PB δp assigns positive (net) value to the promises of
future partisan benefits offered by the incumbent leader.
This definition satisfies several appealing properties. First, a useful definition of
party discipline must distinguish between the non-partisan and the partisan frameworks.
Specifically, party discipline should not reflect unity in voting that is driven by the absence
of conflict between PBs over their preferred alternative. Instead, party discipline must
indicate the ability of the party, and in particular of the party leadership, to mold PBs’
behavior. Krehbiel (1993) makes the point sharply: “[D]o legislators vote with fellow
party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question, or ... because
of their agreement about the policy in question.”13 The comparison of the partisan and
non-partisan thresholds δp and δnp accomplishes this demand without being (directly)
influenced by the distribution of preferences within the party (e.g., heterogeneity of PBs’
preferences, σ). This measurement of discipline, moreover, is largely consistent with that
employed in recent empirical studies of voting in the US Congress (Snyder and Groseclose
(2000), McCarty et al. (2001), Cox and Poole (2002)). As a result of this, the theoretical
13In the same vein, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that “ [I]nvestigations of parties as floor voting
coalitions ought to be conducted in terms of loyalty to party leaders and not, as has usually been done
in the previous literature, in terms of general party cohesion.” Similarly, Tsebelis (1995) differentiates
discipline - “the ability of parties to eliminate dissent after a decision is made” -from cohesion - “the
size of differences [in policy preferences] before the discussion.” (italics in original).
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results herein can be readily contrasted with the data, for this and other legislatures
where roll call voting data is available.
The notion I introduce differs from what is the norm in the literature in the choice
of the non-partisan framework to employ. In particular, this definition does not include
changes in party members’ voting behavior that are achieved with resources that could
have otherwise been destined to non-party members (i.e., pork). This view emphasizes
that allocating pork to party members means having to “buy” their support, and is
therefore not an indication of power within the organization.
4.2 The Leader as an Agent of the Majority of the Party
I consider first the situation in which the incumbent leader has no access to spot resources
(R = 0) and can be removed by the rebellion of a simple majority of the party (µ =
1/2). I show that in this setting, credible promises of future partisan benefits confer
only limited strength to the party leader, and a result similar in spirit to Aldrich and
Rohde’s conditional party governance (Aldrich and Rohde (1997,1998)) emerges: the
incumbent leader will use promises of partisan benefits to support the party line only if
the leadership’s incentives are aligned (ex ante) with those of the majority of the party.
Recall that θ0 denotes the ideal policy of the ex ante party median. Then:
Proposition 2 Let R = 0 and µ = 1/2 be given. Then (i) party votes occur in equilib-
rium if and only if v (θ0) < 0 (i.e., iff x
θ0 q), and (ii) in party votes, the ex ante median
is in the incumbent’s coalition: δp ≤ θ0.
To see the intuition for this result, consider Figure 1. Recall that PBs use the infor-
mation contained in their own ideal policy, as well as the location of the ex ante median
to estimate the distribution of preferences within the party. A PB with ideal policy
equal to the ex ante median believes he is exactly centrist, with half the party being
more right-winged and half being more left-winged than himself. By the nature of the
equilibrium strategies, if this PB is also the critical PB, he will believe that half the
party will support the incumbent and the other half will oppose her. Then since here
µ = 1/2, he must attach probability 1/2 to the incumbent falling, and therefore a (net)
value of zero to her promises (note in the figure that p(δ) = 0 at δ = θ0). Since ep(δ) is
continuously decreasing, but everywhere flatter than v(δ), then for positive discipline we
must have δp < θ0. But this is only possible if the ex ante median θ0 prefers x to q (if
θ0 > δnp ≡ x+q2 ).
Note that this result holds independently of the level of partisan benefits available to
the incumbent leader. The general moral is that even if credible per se and significant
in amount, promises of future benefits will be relevant to alter voting behavior only if
party members believe that the incumbent leader has a strong hold to the reins of power.
Proposition 2 shows that with no resources to distribute on the spot, the leadership of a
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majoritarian institution is instead unstable (or more appropriately conditionally stable)
and influence follows from the bottom up: promises are useful (and used) only if ex ante
a majority of the party agrees with the incumbent leader on the ranking of alternatives
in the first place.
The next proposition shows that the (limited) power that electoral benefits confer
to the leadership in this environment can be attributed entirely to the heterogeneity of
policy preferences among party backbenchers. That is, party discipline is monotonically
increasing with the heterogeneity of party members’ preferences, and vanishes in the limit
as this heterogeneity goes to zero.
Proposition 3 14 Let R = 0 and µ = 1/2 be given. In equilibrium, discipline in party
votes decreases with the homogeneity of PBs’ preferences, and Lim
σ→0
d = 0.
To get an intuition for this result, recall that PBs use both (i) public information
about the central tendency of the party and (ii) the information contained in their own
preferences to form beliefs about the distribution of fellow party members’ preferences
(and thus ultimately about their actions). When party members’ preferences are hetero-
geneous, only the ex ante median believes he is ”centrist”, attaching equal probability
to any member having ideal policy higher or lower than his own. PBs with ideal policy
θi < θ0, instead, believe that a majority of the party is to the left of the ex ante median.
The informational content of a PB’s ideal policy, in turn, increases with the homogeneity
of the party. This implies, in particular, that PBs with ideal policy θi < θ0 will attach
a higher probability to the incumbent being overthrown (and thus a lower value to her
promises of electoral benefits) the more homogeneous the party is. Note, however, that
we are not concerned with how any arbitrary PB forms its beliefs, but with how the
critical PB δp does. But we know from proposition 2 that when the incumbent can be
overthrown by a simple majority of rebelling PBs, the critical PB δp assigns positive
value to the incumbent’s promises of electoral benefits only if the ex ante median is in
the incumbent’s coalition; i.e., only if δp < θ0. The previous argument then implies that
if discipline is positive, it must decrease with an increase in the homogeneity of PBs’
preferences.15
Heterogeneity is crucial here in that it allows the possibility of conflict, which the
leader can exploit to bolster the support for the party line. In fact, as the previous result
shows, in the naked setting of proposition 3 this is all the leader has, and as PBs are
almost perfectly homogeneous, a leader that needs the support of a majority of the party
14For the proof, see that of proposition 5, which includes this as a special case.
15Opposite to the case of heterogeneous preferences, where as I noted only the ex ante median believes
he is ”centrist”, in the limit as σ goes to zero every individual believes he is ”centrist” (as no weight
is given to the ex ante median). But then for the critical PB, whose ideal policy coincides with the
symmetric strategy’s cutoff point, electoral benefits offered by the incumbent must have no value. This
means that electoral benefits will have no bite in equilibrium, and therefore discipline must vanish in
equilibrium as σ goes to zero.
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is powerless against the collective principal. In other words, it is the only when there is
conflict and uncertainty about the position of fellow party legislators that the leader can
be powerful with (just) promises of future benefits.16
4.3 Vote Buying
The analysis so far assumed that the incumbent could be overthrown by a simple majority
of PBs, and that the incumbent could not use resources other than the partisan electoral
benefits to sway legislators’ behavior. In this section I relax these assumptions. I show
that while both innovations have the unambiguous effect of increasing the leader’s power,
they also have substantively different repercussions with respect to party backbenchers,
the relation of the leader with the party, and the formation of legislative coalitions.
Being endowed with pork, the incumbent can now buy the support of legislators in
the opposition. This, however, has an opportunity cost, as buying the opposition means
weakening the support inside the party. The key to the results in this section is that this
cost is magnified in a party vote as a result of a complementarity between the allocation
of pork to party members and the value of promises of future partisan benefits. In a
non-partisan vote - where PBs’ beliefs about the actions of fellow party members are
irrelevant - decreasing the allocation of pork to the party by one dollar leads to an
equivalent reduction in the value of the incumbent’s offer. In a party vote, instead, the
value of the incumbent’s promises of partisan benefits is tied to the fate of the leader.
But a reduction in the allocation of pork to party members will induce PBs to anticipate
a lower aggregate support for the party line and, as a result, a higher probability of the
incumbent being overthrown, leading ultimately to a depreciation of the value of the
incumbent’s promises of partisan benefits.
The first implication of this logic is in the impact of endowing the leader with pork
resources upon what I have referred to as conditional party governance. In the context of
the previous section I showed that party benefits were used to favor the party line only
when - according to public information - the majority of the party preferred the party
line to the legislative alternative. When the incumbent can influence legislators’ decisions
with pork, however, party votes can exist in equilibrium even if q
θ0 x. Nevertheless, in
the absence of a supermajority requirement for removal of the leader, the influence of
backbenchers is not lost, but only reshaped in terms of a lower bound of payments that
needs to be allocated to party members for party resources to be in play. In particular,
the allocation of pork to party members has to be at least as large as to attain the
support of the (ex ante) party median. The simple result follows, in effect, from the
proof of proposition 2, and is stated in the following remark.
16With an underlying “social choice” model, Aldrich and Rodhe (1998) and Cox and McCubbins
(1993) also argue that the power of the leader (the agenda setter) increases with the heterogeneity of
party members’ preferences. For a discussion of the differences between the two approaches, see section
6.
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Remark 3 Let µ = 1/2. If there is a party vote in equilibrium, r ≥ −v(θ0)
Raising the bar for removal of the incumbent leader, instead, directly reduces the
influence (and well-being) of backbenchers. Party discipline increases with the protection
to the incumbent 1− µ, and therefore internal dissent is reduced even in the absence of
compensations. Indeed, for every µ ∈ (0, 1/2] there is a rmin (µ) such that rp (µ) ≥
rmin (µ) for a party vote to be possible in equilibrium, and it can be easily verified that
rmin (µ) is an increasing function, with maximum at rmin (1/2) = −v(θ0). Furthermore,
the next proposition shows that when party votes occur in equilibrium, the incumbent
will allocate less pork to buy opposition legislators the more contestable the leadership
position is. The model thus predicts a subtle relationship between the allocation of pork,
the power of nomination, and party’s legislative institutions. More vulnerable leaders
will enjoy less power from nominations. It is precisely this type of leaders, however, who
will also tend to allocate more pork to buy the support of members of their own party,
increasing discipline as a result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the incumbent would call a party vote with µ = µ0 and that
µ1 < µ0. Then rp (µ
0) ≥ rp (µ1), with strict inequality if rp (µ1) ∈ (rmin (µ1) , R).
Note that this result holds even when, as here, the leader doesn’t care about the
leadership per se. In essence, the result is due to the fact that increasing the contestability
of the leadership boosts the complementarity between pork and the value of electoral
benefits. In this situation, “weak” leaders find more profitable buying their own party,
thus avoiding large depreciations of the value of the future benefits at their disposal.
4.4 Cohesion and Discipline Revisited
In the context of Section 4.2, I showed that in equilibrium, discipline in party votes
decreases with the homogeneity of PBs’ preferences. Proposition 5 revisits this result,
allowing for arbitrary majority requirements for removal and allocations of pork to party
members. The proposition shows that provided µ = 1/2, the result does generalize to
arbitrary r ≤ R as stated. When µ < 1/2, instead, the main intuition described above
breaks down, and this is no longer the case. The gist of the argument is that with
µ < 1/2, it is possible for the ex ante party median to be in the rebelling coalition,
while still having positive discipline. When this is the case, the same argument used in
proposition 3 shows that an increase in the heterogeneity of preferences will now diminish
discipline.
Proposition 5 Let µ = 1/2 and r ∈ [0, R] be given. In equilibrium, discipline in party
votes decreases with the homogeneity of PBs’ preferences, and Lim
σ→0
d = 0. With µ < 1/2,
however, this is not necessarily so, and Lim
σ→0
d > 0.
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5 Extension: Endogenous Challenge
In the setting of the basic model, I assumed that challenges to the incumbent party leader
occurred if and only if she decided to call a party vote. In this section I endogeneize the
challenge decision. Given the lesser role of pork in this stage, I take an allocation r
as given, and focus instead on the characteristics of the policy alternative being sup-
ported by the incumbent leader.17 I show that under the assumptions in this section,
(i) the incumbent is only challenged in party votes. Moreover, I distinguish two sets of
alternatives x possibly being supported by the incumbent leader in party votes: a set
of “moderate” policies {x : q ≤ x ≤ x˜} and a set of “radical” policies {x : x ≥ x˜}. I
show that (ii) the incumbent is not challenged in party votes for moderate policies, but
always challenged in party votes for radical policies. The basic model is thus a stylized
description of this extended framework. After reviewing the amendments I impose to
the model, I provide a formal statement of these results, and note its implications for the
uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes.
5.1 The Extended Model
I will consider the following ”challenge technology”. After the incumbent’s choice, PBs
in a given set of potential challengers Ω simultaneously decide whether they will propose
or not a challenge to the incumbent leader. I assume that the preferences of potential
challengers are common knowledge, that {θi : i ∈ Ω} is compact and let ω ≡ min{θi : i ∈
Ω}. A challenge occurs if some potential challenger i ∈ Ω proposes a challenge. Denoting
the challenge decision of individual i ∈ Ω by ci(θi;x) ∈ {0, 1}, and by c(x) ∈ {0, 1}
the occurrence of a challenge, then c(x) = 1 whenever ci(θi;x) = 1 for some i ∈ Ω,
and c(x) = 0 otherwise. Proposing the challenge is costless, and provides no special
benefits (in the event the challenge is successful) vis a vis the remaining PBs opposing
the incumbent leader.
I modify the definition of equilibrium to exclude equilibria containing weakly dom-
inated strategies. I also replace A1 with the following (more demanding) assumption
about PBs’ preferences:18
Assumption (A1’). For every x, there exists α ≥ α > 0 s.t. for all (θi, θ′i) with θ′i > θi,
α(x− q) (θ′i − θi) ≥ v(θi;x)− v(θ′i;x) ≥ α(x− q) (θ′i − θi)
17In our formulation, pork allocations are unalterable, and therefore are not the prime determinants
of challenges to the incumbent leader. The central elements, instead, are given by the policy alternatives
being considered and the allocation of electoral benefits.
18Note that this is also satisfied by a quadratic utility function u(xi; θi) = −b (xi − θi)2 (here α = α =
2b)
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5.2 Main Result, and Implications for Uniqueness of Equilib-
rium Outcomes
Proposition 1 showed that given any pair of policy alternatives (q, x), the party vote
game has a unique equilibrium provided there is sufficient uncertainty about the central
tendency of the party. Specifically, keeping q fixed, I showed that for any x there is a
η(x) such that a party vote equilibrium is unique whenever η > η(x). Under reasonable
assumptions about preferences, however, η(x) decreases with |x− q|, and Lim
x→q
η(x) =∞.
Thus for fixed η, there is an x sufficiently close to q such that η < η(x), and the sufficient
condition for uniqueness is not met. Note, however, that while the absence of policy-
driven conflict allows for multiple resolutions of a challenge should one occur, it also
diminishes the benefit of mounting the challenge in the first place. Proposition 6 shows
that if PBs are sufficiently uncertain about the distribution of fellow party members
preferences, and challengers do not use weakly dominated strategies, challenges occur in
equilibrium only for “radical” alternatives, and these always have a unique resolution.
Proposition 6 There exists a η such that for all x > q, whenever η > η: c(x) = 1 ⇒
η > η(x). Moreover, for each η > η there exists a x˜η ∈ R such that c(x) = 1⇔ x ≥ x˜η.
With the more stringent assumption (A1’), the basic model in the paper can thus be
seen as a reduced form of this extended framework, provided that alternatives are “not
too close” in the policy space. More precisely, if x ∈ {z ∈ R : z ≥ x˜η} (if x is in the set
of “radical” policies), the incumbent is challenged if and only if the vote is a party vote,
and challenges have a unique resolution. For moderate policies {x : q ≤ x ≤ x˜η}, instead,
in equilibrium the incumbent is not even challenged in party votes. When policy-driven
conflict is low, the model boils down to a standard model of unidirectional influence.
Then again, it is in these situations where there is no scope for exercising power in the
first place.
Establishing uniqueness of equilibria in the extended framework is specially relevant
for the analysis of a policy choice stage, which I am not undertaking in this paper in order
to concentrate on tradeoff between resources available to the leader and the contestability
of the leadership position. The partition of the policy space in a set of moderate and
radical alternatives implicit in proposition 6 implies immediately that discipline will be
monotonically decreasing with x. Moreover, assuming that the party leader has agenda
setting power, we can apply fairly directly some of our previous conclusions regarding
spot payments to her choice of party line. In addition to its direct effect, the party line
has an indirect component operating through its effect on backbenchers’ beliefs regarding
the incumbent survival. An “extreme” party line (relative to the preferred position of
the ex ante median) conveys information to all PBs regarding general discontent with the
incumbent’s choice, and thus lowers the impact of promises of future benefits. An obvious
implication of this logic is that discipline falls with x faster than in a unidirectional model
of influence, and faster the more vulnerable the leader is to internal challenges. I leave
for future work a more complete analysis of this important topic.
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6 Relation with the Literature
6.1 (Non-formal) Political Science Literature
The predominant view among scholars studying European and Latin American legislative
party organizations (as well as those prevalent in early theories of legislative leadership)
grants significant power to party leaders. Leaders, it is argued, have wide discretion
over the allocation of partisan resources, and based on their control of nominations,
committee assignments, and other resources alike, are able to discipline backbenchers
to follow the party line against their own preferences.19 Implicit in this view is the
notion that leaders “are not checked by those who hold subsidiary positions within the
organization” (Casinelli (1953), Michels (1962)).
Absent from the leaders-as-generals approach is the fact that leaders cannot lead with-
out the support of their followers (McKenzie (1964), Jones (1968), Panebianco (1988),
Calvert (1987), Sinclair (1983), Cox and McCubbins (2005b)).20 The reaction to this mis-
match led to the currently predominant theories of legislative leadership in the US, which
conceive leaders as “agents” of the rank and file (Sinclair (1983), Kiewit and McCubbins
(1991), Aldrich and Rodhe (1998), Cox and McCubbins (1993)). The leader-as-agent
analogy, however, is not without problems, or at least not if the analogy is to be drawn
with standard principal agent theory in economics (Cox and McCubbins (2005a)). The
relevant wedge is the substantial heterogeneity of preferences within the party that is typ-
ical in modern legislative parties but completely absent from standard principal-agency
theory in economics. Here the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard so common
in the formal approaches play a much lesser role. Instead, the substantial “agency prob-
lem” in this relationship is what Kiewit and McCubbins (1991) dub Madison’s dilemma;
that the resources or authority turned over to the “agent” for the purpose of furthering
the interests of the principals can be turned against them.21
Aldrich and Rohde (1997, 1998) attempted to address this shortcoming in their theory
of conditional party governance. In their view, the rank and file simply does not delegate
the powers to the leadership unless their views are sufficiently homogeneous: “If there is
much diversity in preferences within a party, a substantial portion of the members will
be reluctant to grant strong powers to the leadership, or to resist the vigorous exercise of
existing powers, because of the realistic fear that they may be used to produce outcomes
unsatisfactory to the members in question.” Aldrich and Rodhe (1997). When prefer-
ences are sufficiently homogeneous, instead, this delegation occurs, and the structure of
the leader’s incentives makes her ”internalize the goals of the members, and therefore
behave to a large extent in the party members’ best interest.” (Cox and McCubbins
19See any of the contributions in Morgenstern and Nacif, eds (2002) or Bowler et al., eds (1999)
20Moreover, empirically, the leaders-as-generals approach can’t account for the wide variation in the
available measures of discipline across countries with similar electoral rules, across parties within the
same country, and across different periods within the same party (see for example Morgenstern (2004)).
21The first to recognize the shift in focus, however, are the proponents of the agency theory of leadership
themselves. See for example Kiewit and McCubbins (1991).
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(1993)).22
In this paper, I build on Aldrich and Rohde’s approach, while emphasizing a markedly
different timing and coordination of the collective (heterogeneous) principal. It is not the
choice of a single PB, I argue, to ”resist the vigorous exercise of existing powers”. Instead,
resisting the exercise of existing powers, or removing existing powers, is a collective choice
determined by the common knowledge of opposition to the incumbent. The explicit
consideration of how this impure coordination problem is resolved is then essential to
understand the limits of the incumbent’s power over legislators. From this perspective,
the alternative views expressed in the leaders-as-generals and leaders-as-agents traditions
can be taken to represent opposite assumptions about the degree of difficulty for the rank
and file to effectively coordinate in opposing their leaders; i.e., in constituting an effective
check to the leader’s power: while this coordination is precluded outright in the world of
the iron law of oligarchy (Michels (1962)), it is assumed to work without frictions in the
conditional party governance framework of Aldrich and Rohde and the cartel theory of
Cox and McCubbins.
6.2 Formal Literature
The early formal literature of legislatures and elections either treated parties as unitary
actors or ignored them altogether. In recent years, a second generation of research in
formal political economy has started to fill this gap.
A first group takes discipline in legislatures as given and focuses on how parties as
organizations alter the number and characteristics of electoral alternatives.23 Closest
to this paper among these are Snyder and Ting (2002) and Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2006). Snyder and Ting (2002) take the number of parties (two) as given,
but allow candidates in different districts to choose which party to join, if any, after
observing parties’ choices of platforms. Elected candidates affiliated with a party face
a cost (which the authors interpret as discipline) which is increasing in the distance
22The seminal contributions by Cox and McCubbins (Cox and McCubbins (1993), Cox and McCubbins
(2005b)) share this perspective and build on it, distinguishing between positive and negative agenda
power. While conditional party governance describes positive agenda power, negative agenda power is
unconditional.
23In Alesina and Spear (1988), intergenerational transfers allow (finitely lived) politicians within the
(infinitely lived) party to credibly choose a policy different than his or her own ideal policy, in Roemer
(1999) the party platform is a compromise among internal factions with different preferences for holding
office and determining policy. Levy (2004), Morelli (2004), and Osborne and Tourky (2004) all ana-
lyze endogenous party formation. Levy (2004) focuses on the role of parties as institutions that allow
politicians to commit to a platform other than their own ideal policy. Morelli (2004) argues that parties
facilitate coordination among voters, and studies how plurality and PR electoral systems influence party
formation and policy choice. Osborne and Tourky (2004) study a citizen-candidate model where “par-
ties” (sets of individuals who “champion the same policy”) reduce the costs of “championing a policy”.
Caillaud and Tirole (2002) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2005) also focus on the influence of parties at the
electoral stage, but emphasize instead their role in the selection of candidates. See Merlo (2005) for a
review of work in these areas.
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between their ideal policy and the party platform. As a result of the endogenous sorting
induced in equilibrium, party labels provide information to voters about the preferences
of politicians. Building on Snyder and Ting (2002), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita
(2006) provide a model in which party discipline is endogenously determined. Here party
platforms are taken as given, but the levels of “discipline” are optimally chosen by the
party leaders. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) therefore focus on discipline
from an ex ante, institutional design perspective. In the current paper, instead, I have
taken party institutions as given, and focused on how effective discipline is affected in
equilibrium by backbenchers’ beliefs about the continuity of the incumbent (and the
party line).
A second group of papers focuses on the influence of parties at the policy determina-
tion stage building on the seminal - and party-less - Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of
legislative bargaining.24 Calvert and Dietz (1998) generate cohesive, party-like voting by
introducing externalities in an otherwise standard Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model, but
(aware of Krehbiel (1993)’s critique) suggest to think of parties as “nonstationary equi-
librium institutions”. This proposal is undertaken by Calvert and Fox (2003), who show
the existence of a nonstationary equilibrium of the BF satisfying properties of “partisan”
behavior.25 Jackson and Moselle (2002), instead, see parties are institutions external to
the game that facilitate commitment “to follow the same single action when recognized,
and to approve each other’s proposals” (see Baron (1989) for a similar assumption). With
this perspective about parties, Jackson and Moselle analyze endogenous party formation
within a modified BF model in which decisions are made over both ideological and dis-
tributive dimensions. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) also obtain cohesive voting not
being driven by preference homogeneity as an equilibrium of a modified Baron and Fere-
john (1989) model. In their model, however, cohesive voting is not associated to partisan
behavior, but instead to the “vote of confidence procedure”, an institutional feature of
parliamentary systems which ties the success of a bill to the continuation of government
(see also Huber (1996)). This alternative argument - competing with the partisan theo-
ries such as the one I present here in terms of their quantitative significance to explain
observed levels of discipline across polities - should be regarded as complementary with
the partisan approach. 26
Two recent contributions (Myerson (2005) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2002,
2003)) are directly concerned with challenges to incumbent leaders. Myerson (2005) also
24But see also Laver and Shepsle (1990), who focus on the role of intraparty politics in coalition and
government formation.
25Members of the majority have higher equilibrium payoffs, in non-punishment phases their proposals
allocate more to fellow majority members than to members of the minority, and deviations are followed
by punishment phases of finite length.
26While parliamentary systems are (according to most observers) associated with high levels of cohesion
in voting, the difference in parliamentary and presidential systems is not powerful enough to explain the
observed variation in discipline across polities, across parties in the same country, and across periods for
the same party. In fact, Diermeier and Feddersen (1998)’s motivation for presidential systems focuses
heavily on the US Congress. Even here, as they themselves argue, policy coalitions are hardly modified
issue to issue, and the available measures of discipline display significant variation throughout history.
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takes as a starting point that leaders “can win and hold power against challengers only
with the costly efforts of many supporters who must expect rewards from his success”,
but stresses that leaders cannot be expected to reward the effort of followers if they can
find alternative sources of support. This problem is solved, he argues, by “constitutions”:
agreements - the terms of which can be monitored by activists - that require the leader
to share the spoils of power.27 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2002, 2003) focus on how
variations in the size of the “selectorate” and in the relative size of the coalition necessary
to replace leaders (what I have called µ in this paper) influence the incumbent’s optimal
allocation of resources between public goods and pork. The effect of beliefs about the
leader’s survival so heavily emphasized here is completely secondary in Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (1999, 2002, 2003) because of their focus on a particular equilibrium of the game.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper built on two basic elements characterizing leadership in political parties.
First, leaders need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading. Second,
at least some of the resources available to the leadership are promises of future bene-
fits, which can only be delivered if the incumbent retains the command of the party.
As a result, discipline will be endogenously determined by backbenchers’ beliefs about
the extent of support to the incumbent among other party legislators. More generally,
while discipline will be affected by the nature and amount of resources available to the
leaders, the impact of these various instruments will be filtered by how each of them
contributes to backbenchers’ expectations about the incumbent’s survival. Building on
these main insights, the paper provided several novel empirical implications for the com-
parative analysis of parties and legislatures, which can contribute to account for the wide
unexplained variation in the available measures of discipline across countries with similar
electoral rules, across parties within the same country, and across different periods within
the same party. Most of these results, moreover, can also be naturally applied to address
behavior in other types of organizations such as firms, unions, autocratic governments
and organized crime.
Several avenues for future research seem worth pursuing. A natural next step is to
relax the simplicity of the current vote buying model to study optimal size and compo-
sition of partisan coalitions. Modeling dynamics would also allow us to analyze whether
an incumbent would optimally engage in vote buying at the initial phase or the end of
her tenure. Along the same avenue, it would be interesting to extend this model along
the lines of Angeletos et al. (2006) to focus on the dynamics of discipline and revolts. A
second natural next step is to focus on the policy choice stage, the analysis of which I am
not undertaking in this paper to concentrate on the tradeoff between resources available
27These constitutions, moreover, serve a role in equilibrium selection. As in this paper, the fact that
individuals want to be aligned with the winning side leads in Myerson (2005) to multiple equilibria.
According to Myerson, however, coordination on the incumbent’s preferred equilibrium depends on
her/him following behavior specified in the agreement.
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to the leader and the contestability of the leadership position. Establishing uniqueness of
equilibria in the extended framework of section 5 was important to facilitate this future
research.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Remark 2. Consider first strategy profile (1). Since θi|θ ∼ N(θ, σ2), the
proportion of PBs voting for x is then given by 1 − Φ( θi−θ
σ
), where Φ (·) is the c.d.f. of
the standard normal. The incumbent survives the challenge (with certainty) if
1− Φ
(
θi − θ
σ
)
> µ⇔ θ > θi − σΦ−1(1− µ)
Since this is true by hypothesis, the expected net payoff of voting for q for PB i is
given by v (θi) − r − e. Then optimality implies κpi (θi; r) = q if θi < v−1 (r + e) ≡ θi
and κpi (θi; r) = x if θi > θi. Similarly, consider strategy profile (2). The proportion of
PBs voting for x is then given by 1− Φ( θi−θ
σ
). The incumbent leader will fall for sure if
1−Φ( θi−θ
σ
) < µ⇔ θ < θi−σΦ−1(1−µ), which again is true by hypothesis. The expected
net payoff of voting for x for PB i is then given by r− e− v (θi), and optimality implies
κpi (θi; r) = x ∀i : θi > θi and κpi (θi; r) = q ∀i : θi < θi.
Proof of Proposition 1. The following definitions will be used here. For a given
strategy profile of the party vote game {κpi }, where each κpi : Θ× [0, R]→ {q, x}, let ξ(z)
denote the proportion of PBs for whom κpi (z; r) = x, let Γ(θ; ξ) denote the proportion of
PBs that would end up supporting x given a particular realization of θ and an aggregate
voting mapping ξ, and let Π(θi; ξ) denote the expected net benefit of supporting x for a
PB with ideal policy θi, given ξ.
Proposition 1 follows from three lemmas. In Lemma 1, I show that (i) {δ : pi(δ) =
0} 6= ∅, and that (ii) with δp ∈ {δ : pi(δ) = 0}, there exists a symmetric equilibrium of
the party vote game in which κpi (θi, r) = x for all i such that θi ≥ δp and κpi (θi, r) = q
for all i such that θi < δp. In Lemma 2 I show that if pi(δ) is strictly increasing {δ :
pi(δ) = 0} has a single element δp, and this equilibrium is unique. The next step is
thus to provide a sufficient condition for pi(δ) to be strictly increasing. Note that this
happens iff ep′ (δ) > v′ (δ) for every δ, and that we know already that v (·) is a strictly
decreasing function. Lemma 3 shows that while p(δ) is also a decreasing function, it can
be made arbitrarily flat by reducing the precision of public information (by increasing η).
Specifically, for any Q > 0, there exist a η(Q) such that if η > η(Q), then |p′(δ)| < Q.
Then pi(δ) is strictly increasing if η > η
(
1
e
|v′(δ)|), and we are done.
Lemma 1 {δ : pi(δ) = 0} 6= ∅. Let δp ∈ {δ : pi(δ) = 0}. There exists a symmetric
equilibrium of the party vote game in which κpi (θi, r) = x for all i such that θi ≥ δp and
κpi (θi, r) = q for all i such that θi < δp.
Proof. Our first task is to show that {δ : pi(δ) = 0} 6= ∅. Consider the points
θi ≡ v−1(r + e) and θi ≡ v−1(r − e) that were defined in Remark 2. Note that the net
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payoff of voting for q for PB i in the event that the incumbent survives the challenge is
given by v (θi) − r − e. Since the net payoff of voting for q for PB i is always at least
v (θi) − r − e, then θi < θi ⇒ Π(θi; ξ) < 0 for any ξ. Similarly, since the net payoff of
voting for x for PB i is always at least r − e − v (θi) (where the challenge is succesful
for sure), then θi > θi ⇒ Π(θi; ξ) > 0 for any ξ. It should be noted that the points
θi and θi are well defined, since v(·) is continuously decreasing, and Lim
θi→−∞
v(θi) = ∞,
while Lim
θi→∞
v(θi) = −∞ by A1. Now, pi(δ) ≡ Π(δ, δ) ≡ Π(θi = δ; ξ = 1{θi≥δ}). Then
the previous argument implies, in particular, that pi(δ) > 0 for δ > θi, and pi(δ) < 0
for δ < θi. Since pi(δ) is continuous, this implies that {δ : pi(δ) = 0} 6= ∅. Next, let
δp ∈ {δ : pi(δ) = 0}. To show the existence of the symmetric equilibrium, it is now
enough to show that Π(θi; 1{θi≥δ}) is increasing in θi. But it is easy to see from (1) that
P (δ, θi) is increasing in θi. Since v (θi) is decreasing, the result follows.
Lemma 2 Suppose that pi(δ) is strictly increasing. Then {δ : pi(δ) = 0} has a single
element δp, and the equilibrium of Lemma 1 is unique.
Proof (Morris and Shin (1998). If pi(δ) is stricly increasing, there is a unique
δp solving pi(δ) = 0. I show next that this in turn implies that the symmetric equilibrium
with switching strategies at δp is the unique equilibrium. So consider any equilibrium of
the game, and define the numbers
z ≡ inf{z|ξ(z) > 0} and z ≡ sup{z|ξ(z) < 1}
Note first that
z ≡ sup{z|ξ(z) < 1} ≥ sup{z|0 < ξ(z) < 1}
≥ inf{z|0 < ξ(z) < 1} ≥ inf{z|ξ(z) > 0} ≡ z (IS)
Now, for any z ∈ {z|ξ(z) > 0}, there is some i for which xpi (z; r) = x. This is only
consistent with equilibrium behavior if the payoff to supporting x (for mr i and for anyone
else, since they are all identical, ex ante) is at least as high as the payoff to supporting q
given ideal policy z; i.e., Π(z, ξ) ≥ 0. By continuity, this is also true at z; i.e.,
Π(z, ξ) ≥ 0 (2)
Now consider the payoff Π(z, 1{θi≥z}). It is clear that, for any z, 1{θi≥z}(z) ≥ ξ(z).
But - in general - whenever ξ(z) ≥ ξ′(z) for any z, then Π(z, ξ) ≥ Π(z, ξ′). Hence
Π(z, 1{θi≥z}) ≥ Π(z, ξ) for any z, and in particular
pi(z) ≡ Π(z, 1{θi≥z}) ≥ Π(z, ξ) (3)
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Thus combining (2) and (3) I obtain
pi(z) ≥ 0 (4)
Now by hypothesis, pi(δ) is increasing in δ. Since δp is the unique value of δ which
solves pi(δ) = 0, this means z ≥ δp. A symmetric argument establishes that z ≤ δp. Thus
z ≤ δp ≤ z. This together with (IS) implies that z = δp = z. Thus in any equilibrium
the x’s aggregate support mapping ξ, and thus the strategy of every PB, xpi , is given by
1{θi≥δp}.
Lemma 3 p(·) is a decreasing function of δ. Furthermore, for any Q > 0, there exists a
η(Q) such that if η > η(Q), then |p′(δ)| < Q
Proof. Since(
θ − θ̂ (θi)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)
=
1
η̂
[
σ2 (δ − θ0) + η2 (δ − θi)
σ2 + η2
− σΦ−1(1− µ)
]
, then
p(δ) = P (δ, δ) = 1− 2Φ
(
1
η̂
[
σ2
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σΦ−1(1− µ)
])
Hence
∂p(δ)
∂δ
= −2φ
(
1
η̂
[
σ2
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σΦ−1(1− µ)
])
1
η
1√
1 + η
2
σ2
That p′(δ) < 0 follows immediately. And since |p′(δ)| is bounded above by 2
η
, |p′(δ)| <
Q for η > 2/Q = η(Q).
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that the incumbent will call a party vote in
equilibrium if and only if discipline is positive. Now, d = δnp − δp ≥ 0 ⇔ p(δp) ≥ 0.
That is, discipline is positive if and only if the critical PB δp assigns net positive value to
the incumbent’s promises of electoral benefits. But with µ = 1/2, p(δp) ≥ 0 ⇔ δp ≤ θ0,
because
Pr (Γ(θ, δp) < µ|θi = δp) = Pr (θ < δp|θi = δp) < 1/2⇔ δp < θ0
That is, with µ = 1/2, the critical PB δp assigns net positive value to the incumbent’s
promises of electoral benefits if and only if the ex ante party median is in the incumbent’s
coalition (iff δp < θ0). Hence d ≥ 0 ⇔ δp ≤ θ0. Now, with r = 0, δnp = v−1(0), and
then v(δnp) = 0. Since ep(δ) is continuously decreasing, but everywhere flatter than v(δ),
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then δnp ≤ θ0 ⇔ δp ≤ δnp ⇔ d ≥ 0. Finally, x
θ0 q ⇔ δnp = v−1(0) ≤ θ0, implying that
x
θ0 q ⇔ d ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The first step is to characterize optimal allocations of
pork to party members under rule µ, rp (µ). Let H ( ·) ≡ [1−G (v−1 ( ·))]. The mass of
legislators in the opposition voting for x given pork offer ro is given by H (ro) β. Note
that H ′ (ro) ≥ 0 for all ro. Pork resource constraint is given by roβ + r ≤ R. Since this
will hold with equality in the optimum, I write ro =
R−r
β
. Conditional on θ, then, y = x
iff H
(
R−r
β
)
β + Γ(θ, δp (r, µ)) ≥ (1+β)2 . Since Γ(θ, δp (r, µ)) = 1− Φ( δp(r,µ)−θσ ), this is
θ ≥ δp (r, µ)− J (r)
, where J (r) ≡ σΦ−1
(
(1−β)
2
+H
(
R−r
β
)
β
)
. Then for the incumbent,
Pr (y = x) = 1− Φ
(
1
η
[(δp (r, µ)− θ0)− J (r)]
)
An optimal allocation of pork for the incumbent rp (µ) maximizes Pr (y = x). The
FOC is: ∣∣∣∣∂δp (rp (µ) , µ)∂r
∣∣∣∣− J ′ (rp (µ))

> 0 and rp (µ) = R
= 0 and rp (µ) ∈ (rmin (µ) , R)
< 0 and rp (µ) = rmin (µ)
(5)
The second and final step is to show that for all r∣∣∣∣∂δp (r, µ0)∂r
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂δp (r, µ1)∂r
∣∣∣∣ whenever µ0 > µ1 (6)
, which implies that∣∣∣∣∂δp (rp (µ1) , µ0)∂r
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂δp (rp (µ1) , µ1)∂r
∣∣∣∣ whenever µ0 > µ1 (7)
Then (7) together with (5) will imply that rp (µ
0) ≥ rp (µ1). Moreover, if rp (µ1) ∈
(rmin (µ
1) , R), so that
∣∣∣∣∂δp(rp(µ1),µ1)∂r ∣∣∣∣ = J ′ (rp (µ1)), then ∣∣∣∣∂δp(rp(µ1),µ0)∂r ∣∣∣∣ > J ′ (rp (µ1)),
and hence rp (µ
0) > rp (µ
1) .
Note that for all r, µ,∣∣∣∣∂δp (r, µ)∂r
∣∣∣∣−1 = ∣∣∣∣∂v (δp (r, µ))∂δ
∣∣∣∣− e ∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ) ;µ)∂δ
∣∣∣∣
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so that (6) can be written as:
e
{∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ0) ;µ0)∂δ
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ1) ;µ1)∂δ
∣∣∣∣} > ∣∣∣∣∂v (δp (r, µ0))∂δ
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣∂v (δp (r, µ1))∂δ
∣∣∣∣ (8)
Note, next, that since in a party vote δp (r, µ) is increasing in µ, then δp (r, µ
1) <
δp (r, µ
0). Assumption (A1) then implies that∣∣v′ (δp (r, µ1))∣∣ ≥ ∣∣v′ (δp (r, µ0))∣∣ (9)
Also, since∣∣∣∣∂p (δ;µ)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ = 2φ(1η̂
[
σ2
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σΦ−1(1− µ)
])
1
η
1√
1 + η
2
σ2
, it can be verified that if d > 0 then ∂
∂µ
(∣∣∣∂p(δ;µ)∂δ ∣∣∣) > 0, so that∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ0) ;µ0)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ0) ;µ1)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ (10)
, and that (ii) ∂
2p(δ;µ)
∂δ2
< 0, so that δp (r, µ
0) > δp (r, µ
1) implies that∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ0) ;µ1)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ1) ;µ1)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ (11)
Then (10) and (11) imply that∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ0) ;µ0)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂p (δp (r, µ1) ;µ1)∂δ
∣∣∣∣ (12)
Then (9) and (12) imply that (8) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note first that
p(δ) = P (δ, δ) = 1− 2Φ
(
1
η̂
[
σ2
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σΦ−1(1− µ)
])
, where
1
η̂
[
σ2
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σΦ−1(1− µ)
]
=
(
θ − θ̂ (θi = δ)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)
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Thus
∂p(δ;σ)
∂σ
= −2φ(·) 1√
σ2 + η2
[
η
σ2 + η2
(δ − θ0)− σ
η
Φ−1 (1− µ)
]
, so that ∂p(δp;σ)
∂σ
≥ 0 if and only if:
θ0 ≥ δp − σΦ−1 (1− µ)
(
1 +
σ2
η2
)
(13)
But if p(δ;σ) increases with σ at δp (σ
′), then σ′′ > σ′ =⇒ δp (σ′′) < δp (σ′). Hence
more heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences must in this case increase discipline. Similarly, if
p(δ;σ) decreases with σ at δp (σ
′), then more heterogeneity of PBs’ preferences must in
this case reduce discipline. Now,
d ≥ 0⇔ p (δp) ≥ 0⇔
(
θ − θ̂ (θi = δp)
η̂
)
θ=δp−σΦ−1(1−µ)
≤ 0
That is, d ≥ 0 if and only if
θ0 ≥ δp −
(
1 +
η2
σ2
)
σΦ−1(1− µ) (14)
Hence, in equilibrium, discipline in party votes necessarily increases with σ if (13) is
satisfied whenever (14) is. Since δp is a continuously decreasing function of θ0, bounded
below by θi ≡ v−1(r + e) and above by θi ≡ v−1(r − e), there is a unique θ∗0 solv-
ing (13) with equality, and a unique θ∗∗0 solving (14) with equality. If µ = 1/2, these
two inequalities collapse to θ0 ≥ δp. Therefore in equilibrium, discipline in party votes
necessarily increases with σ. Moreover, δp = θ0 ⇔ p (δp) = 0 ⇔ θ0 = v−1 (r), so that
θ∗0 = θ
∗∗
0 = v
−1 (r). With µ < 1/2, however, (13) is satisfied whenever (14) is only if
σ ≥ η.
To establish the results for the limit as σ → 0, we show that
Lim
σ→0
d = v−1 (r)− v−1 (r + e [1− 2µ])
To see this, let
f(σ) = Φ
(θ − θ̂ (θi = δ)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)

= Φ
(
1
η
(
1 +
η2
σ2
)− 1
2
(δp (σ)− θ0)−
(
1 +
σ2
η2
) 1
2
Φ−1(1− µ)
)
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Since f(σ) is continuous in an interval around 0,
Lim
σ→0
f(σ) = Φ
(
Lim
σ→0
[
1
η
(
1 +
η2
σ2
)− 1
2
(δp (σ)− θ0)−
(
1 +
σ2
η2
) 1
2
Φ−1(1− µ)
])
Note that Lim
σ→0
(
1 + σ
2
η2
) 1
2
= 1, and Lim
σ→0
1
η
(
1 + η
2
σ2
)− 1
2
= 0. Since δp (σ) is bounded
(by θi and θi), this implies that
Lim
σ→0
f(σ) = Φ
(−Φ−1(1− µ)) = Φ (Φ−1(µ)) = µ
Now,
v (δp) ≡ r + e
1− 2Φ
(θ − θ̂ (θi = δ)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)

Therefore in the limit as σ → 0, v
(
δ˜p
)
= r + e [1− 2µ], so that
Lim
σ→0
d = v−1 (r)− v−1 (r + e [1− 2µ])
Proof of Proposition 6. The result is implied by Remark 4 (which I state without
proof, since this follows immediately), and lemmas 4 and 5
Remark 4 (i) Suppose that for all i in a given set Ω0, ci(θi;x) = 0 for Ω = {i}. Then
in a equilibrium with no weakly dominated strategies, c(x) = 0 for Ω = Ω0; (ii) Suppose
that for a given set Ω0, there exists i ∈ Ω0 such that ci(θi;x) = 1 for Ω = {i}. Then in a
equilibrium with no weakly dominated strategies c(x) = 1 for Ω = Ω0
Lemma 4 There exists a η such that for all x > q, whenever η > η: c(x) = 1 ⇒ η >
η(x).
Proof. (1) Let pov (θi) denote the probability that a PB with ideal point θi assigns to
the incumbent being overthrown in the event of a challenge. Then i ∈ Ω would challenge
the incumbent if and only if pov (θi) e+u (q; θi) ≥ max {u (x; θi) + (e+ r);u (q; θi)}. That
is, iff
pov (θi) ≥ max
{
e+ r − vx (θi)
e
, 0
}
(15)
28
(2) It is easy to see from here that if pov (θi) = 1 for some i (if i believes that if the
incumbent is challenged, she will be overthrown), then i would challenge iff θi < v
−1
x (r).
28
It follows from this that there for any belief about the resolution of a challenge pov (θi)
the incumbent will not be challenged provided that ω = min{θi : i ∈ Ω} > v−1x (r).
(3) A sufficient condition for a unique voting equilibrium following a challenge is that
e |p′(δ)| < |v′(δ)| for every δ. Since for every δ (i) |p′(δ)| < 2
η
and (ii) |v′(δ)| > α(x− q)
(by A1’), this occurs if 2e/η < α(x− q). Then there will always be a unique equilibrium
if
(x− q) < 2e
ηα
⇒ ω > v−1x (r) (16)
Note, moreover, that A1’ implies that v−1x (r) < δ0 − rα(x−q) . Hence (16) becomes:
(x− q) < 2e
ηα
⇒ ω > δ0 − r
α(x− q)
Writing δ0 as q +
(x−q)
2
, this will always be satisfied provided that:
q +
e
ηα
− 1
2
α
α
r
e
η < ω
Since the LHS is decreasing in η and diverges to −∞ as η →∞, for any given ω there
is an η such that whenever η > η, this inequality is satisfied.
Lemma 5 For η > η there exists a x˜η ∈ R such that c(x) = 1⇔ x ≥ x˜η
Proof. Fix η > η. By Lemma 5, c(x) = 1 ⇒ η > η(x). Then for a potential
challenger with ideal point θi, the probability that an active incumbent is overthrown is
given by
Pr
(
θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ)|θi
)
= Φ
(θ − θ̂ (θi)
η̂
)
θ=δ−σΦ−1(1−µ)

Note that Pr (θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ)|θi) is a continuous, decreasing function of θi, and
that Lim
θi→−∞
Pr (θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ)|θi) = 1, while Lim
θi→∞
Pr (θ < δ − σΦ−1(1− µ)|θi) = 0.
Then ci(θi;x) = 1⇔ θi < θc, where θc > θi, and is uniquely defined by:
r + eP (δp, θc) ≡ vx(θc) (17)
28Suppose that pov (θi) = 1 for some i (i.e., i believes that if the incumbent is challenged, she will
be overthrown). Then i would challenge iff θi < v−1x (r). To see this, note that e + r − vx (θi) = 0 if
θi < v
−1
x (e+ r) ≡ θi, while e+ r− vx (θi) > 0, and increases continuously with θi for θi > θi. Letting θc
denote the value of θi that solves 1 = max
{
e+r−vx(θi)
e , 0
}
, it follows that (i) a PB would challenge iff
θi < θc, and that (ii) θc > θi , so that e+ r − vx
(
θc
)
> 0 and then θc = v−1x (r).
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Note that θc so determined is an increasing function of x, θc(x). This result can be
obtained totally differentiating (17) noting that (1) since the LHS is bounded between
r and r + e, vx(θc) > 0 (every challenger prefers q to x), (2) whenever vx(θi) > 0,
vx′(θi) > vx′(θi) for x′ > x (for individuals who prefer q to x, increasing x increases the
payoff of voting for q), (3) δp is increasing in x, and therefore P (δp, θc) is decreasing in
x (since the probability of a succesful challenge increases with x). Also (4) P (δp, θc) is
increasing in θi and (5) vx(θi) is decreasing in θi. For a given x, there will be a challenge
if and only if θc(x) ≥ ω. We know by the previous lemma that if x < q + 2eηα , then
c(x) = 0. Thus θc(x) < ω for x < q +
2e
ηα
. Since θc(·) is an increasing function of x,
c(x) = 1⇔ x ≥ x˜, where x˜ is defined by θc(x˜) ≡ ω; i.e., by
r + eP (δp(x˜), ω) ≡ vex(ω)
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